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1. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter explores one of the most vociferous and controversial debates concerning 
representative forms of voice of the last two decades: the notion of ‘workplace partnership’.  
In simple terms, the notion of workplace partnership is concerned with developing 
collaborative relationships between employment relations actors, especially between trade 
unions and employers, as part of a quest for mutual gains outcomes (Kochan and Osterman, 
1994).  This surge of academic and policy interest in partnership can be related to earlier 
debates regarding employee representation, and in particular the potential benefits and 
costs of trade unions as a form of governance in organisations (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).   
While trade unions can be viewed as negative forces which distort labour market outcomes, 
they can also be viewed as institutions which can positively influence both productivity and 
equality outcomes in organisations (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  From this perspective, 
trade unions are about much more than determining economic (wage) outcomes; they are 
also concerned with the organisational processes, such as the expression of worker voice 
which, and as such can potentially make a positive contribution to the functioning of the 
broader economic and social system, as well as to organisations (Johnstone and Wilkinson, 
2013).  
The chapter comprises four main sections.  The first section explores the meaning of 
partnership, as the term has become a contested and conceptually ambiguous, despite 
widespread usage internationally in both academic and policy circles.   It then presents some 
theoretical perspectives on partnership, and suggests that partnership can be interpreted in 
very different ways, and suggests that the frames of reference developed by Fox (1966) 
remain useful in this respect.  It also helps illustrate how the notion of workplace partnership 
draws upon both continental European traditions of employee representation, as well as US-
influenced debates regarding HRM generally and in particular the ‘high performance’ variant.  
The second section considers the case for and against partnership, and outlines some of the 
main controversies.  The third section then maps some of the international experiences with 
partnership in the UK, Ireland, Australia and New Zealand.  The fourth section reviews some 
of the evidence on the outcomes of partnership, focusing particularly on the experiences of 
the UK and Ireland, while the final section draws some conclusions and assesses the future 
of partnership as a form of employee voice.  
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2. WHAT IS WORKLACE PARTNERSHIP?  
Defining workplace partnership 
Over the last two decades, the notion of workplace ‘partnership’ has become a ubiquitous 
term in both policy and practice circles, and has also attracted a significant amount of 
academic research.  Yet despite the intensity of debates, the term has remained 
conceptually ambiguous and contested.  It is important at the outset, therefore, that we firstly 
evaluate some of the interpretations of ‘partnership’ given the loose and fluid nature of the 
term.  The term participation is often used as an umbrella term for a heterogeneous array of 
practices associated with employee voice and employee representation, which 
acknowledges the various contradictions and strategic tensions which characterised the 
management of work and people (Boxall and Purcell, 2008).  As a result of these tensions, 
the employment relationship is essentially ‘contested’ (Edwards, 2003), between dual 
demands from employers for both ‘control and commitment’ (Walton, 1985) or ‘control and 
consent’ (Hyman, 1987).   Managing these tensions has long been a priority of employers, 
and the search for cooperation has a long history regarding the regulation of the employment 
relationship. Clearly, there are a wide range of options available to employers regarding how 
they choose to manage the sometimes contradictory tensions which characterise the 
employment relationship. 
Thirty years ago, Purcell and Sisson (1983) devised a typology of five management styles 
based upon the extent to which unitarism and pluralism were emphasised.  They suggest 
that unitarist management style could either be authoritarian in character, with workers 
excluded from decision making, or paternalistic, characterised by a more sophisticated but 
individualistic approach to HRM. Alternatively, from a pluralist perspective, there could be a 
greater emphasis upon collective employment relations, normally involving trade unions, and 
union-management relations could be either arms-length and adversarial, which they term 
the ‘sophisticated modern constitutional’ approach, or more flexible and problem-solving 
based, an approach they termed the ‘sophisticated modern consultative approach.  In many 
ways, it is latter approach which best represents contemporary debates about workplace 
‘partnership’ as a form of employee voice.    
Yet while the idea of cooperative union-management relations is far from new, the exact 
meaning of workplace partnership in modern workplaces has remained both ambiguous and 
contested, and a commonly accepted definition has remained somewhat elusive.  
Partnership has thus been described as “an idea with which almost anyone can agree 
without have any clear idea of what they are agreeing about” (Guest and Peccei, 2001, 207).   
The ambiguity and fluidity of the term probably explains in part why the partnership concept 
has been both popular and controversial.   
Nevertheless, several key aspects can be discerned from the literature on partnership.  
Firstly, and in contrast to some of the more unitarist and individualistic HRM literatures, the 
notion of workplace partnership returns to a focus upon understanding the collective 
dimensions of the employment relationship. In voice terms, partnership returns the focus to 
the importance and value of representative forms of employee voice.  Partnership is also 
concerned less with micro-level HR techniques, and more with improving the overall quality 
of the employment relationship and workplace relations.  The emphasis is upon reducing 
conflict and increasing collaboration between stakeholders.  Secondly, and again in contrast 
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to some unitarist HRM debates, an analysis of the partnership literature reveals a concern 
with ‘reciprocity’ , ‘respect’, ‘legitimacy’ and ‘mutual gains’.  Indeed, a core component of 
partnership is a dual concern with balancing the tensions of economic efficiency and 
competitiveness on the one hand, with ethical and fair employment conditions on the other 
(Martinez Lucio and Stuart, 2002).  
While such a philosophy might be considered to be far from novel in many continental 
European nations such as Germany (Frege and Kelly, 2004), the notion gained traction in 
several Anglo-Saxon economies in the 1990s, inspired in part by approaches to employee 
participation and employment relations in Europe.  However, the emphasis was less upon 
the societally-embedded, national-level social partnerships characteristic of more 
coordinated Germanic and Nordic economies.  At a macro-level, social partnerships 
represent a particular and distinctive political and economic approach, with important 
implications employment relations issues such as skills and training, and employee 
participation and representation.  Such approaches are also supported by legislation and 
strong institutional supports, as well as established traditions of European traditions of 
industrial democracy and social dialogue.  
Workplace partnership, however, was concerned more with employment relations at a 
workplace level.  In the UK, two influential policy definitions of this approach were offered in 
the 1990s by the Trades Union Congress (TUC, 1999) and the Involvement and Participation 
Association (IPA, 1997), both of which defined partnership in terms of a particular set of 
principles and commitments regarding the conduct of workplace relations. 
TUC definition  
 Commitment to the success of the enterprise 
 Recognising legitimate interests 
 Commitment to employment security 
 Focus on the quality of working life 
 Transparency 
 Win-win 
IPA definition  
 Joint commitment to the success of the organisation 
 Joint recognition of each other’s legitimate interests 
 Joint commitment to employment security 
 Joint focus on the quality of working life 
 Joint commitment to operating a transparent manner 
 Joint commitment to add value to the arrangement 
Academic definitions, however, tend to define workplace partnership in terms of a particular 
approach to organisational governance: 
“An approach to organisational governance and change that is designed explicitly to permit 
union representatives to participate in organisational decision making, and which exist 
separately from collective bargaining agreements” (Geary and Trif, 2011, 45). 
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“A method of governing an organisation so that corporate strategies incorporate the interests 
of both management and employees – the notion of mutual gains...fostering new forms of 
collaboration and joint action between management and employees” (Teague and Hann, 
2010, 101).  
It has been suggested that a more useful definition of partnership would also identify 
practices and processes association with partnership (Johnstone et.al, 2009).  In terms of 
practices, employee voice is central to all definitions, and this may involve a mix of direct 
participation, representative participation, and financial involvement.  However, most policy 
definitions identify representative voice as a central pillar of partnership.  Often independent 
trade unions are assumed to be the most appropriate vehicle for representative voice, 
though more inclusive definitions, such as those used by the UK government, IPA and CBI, 
have also allowed for the possibility for partnership in non-union contexts.  In addition, 
workplace partnership as used in this sense is distinctive from the use of ‘partnership’ as a 
term to describe a particular model of ownership and organisational structure such as the 
John Lewis Partnership in the UK.  This does not preclude John Lewis from also having a 
partnership employment relations model, characterised by collaboration between employers 
and employees (see Cathcart, 2013 for a discussion). Besides (representative) employee 
voice, complementary HR practices often include mechanisms to support communication, 
flexibility and job security.  
 It is noteworthy that many of the complementary HR practices are similar to those normally 
identified as part of a ‘high performance work system’ or ‘high-commitment’ approaches to 
HRM, where the aim is to increase productivity by raising levels of employee commitment, 
and indeed some commentators draw parallels between partnership and a HPWS approach 
(e.g. Appelbaum, 2000; Danford et.al, 2005; Glover and Butler, 2012).  Inclusive definitions 
inevitably mean the boundaries between partnership and other HRM approaches are 
blurred.   Other commentators, therefore, offer narrower definitions which limit partnership to 
situations where a formal collective agreement, committed to enhancing cooperation 
between employers and independent trade unions and staff associations, is signed by an 
employer and independent representative body (Bacon and Samuel, 2009, 232).  A limitation 
of such a narrow definition, however, is that it excludes the possibility of ‘informal 
partnerships’ as part of what might be termed ‘good industrial relations’ or ‘sophisticated 
HRM’.  It also excludes the possibility of non-union forms of workplace partnership.   A 
potential limitation of such a tight definition, however, is that in most Anglo-Saxon economies 
workplace partnership is a voluntary agreement rather than a legislative requirement and 
state regulation or inducement of partnership may be weak or non-existent (MacNeil et.al, 
2012). It may therefore be preferable to allow for the possibility of informal partnerships and 
collaborative workplace relations which rely upon ‘informal relationships’, ‘shared 
understandings’ and ‘cultural norms’ (Dietz, 2004). 
In terms of processes, decision making processes and the nature of actor relationships are 
crucial.  Partnership rejects autocratic management styles; decision making processes are 
expected to be highly participative with extensive dialogue and consultation between 
management, employees and their representatives at an early stage.  Actor relationships 
thus require high levels of trust, openness and transparency, as well as an overall 
commitment to joint problem solving in a way which is constructive and ultimately supportive 
of business success.  Arms-length adversarialism is believed to be counter to the 
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partnership ethos and the aim is shifting collective employment relations towards a ‘problem 
solving’ approach (Bacon and Storey, 2000) 
Finally, partnership is often associated with particular employment relations outcomes, such 
as ‘adding value’ or ‘sharing success’. Other outcomes typically cited in the partnership 
literature include job security, employee satisfaction, work-life balance, and superior 
organisational performance. Nevertheless, these must be thought of as aspirations which 
can be explored and tested empirically, rather than components of the partnership process.    
Partnership may concern an attempt to achieve these outcomes, irrespective of whether or 
not they are achieved (Johnstone et.al, 2009).  Despite, this caveat, a key part of the 
partnership ethos is the notion that partnership practices and processes will lead  to mutually 
beneficial employment relations outcomes. 
Theoretical perspectives on partnership 
Clearly, the notion of workplace cooperation is not new, but draws upon a long history and 
various attempts at ‘enlightened’ employment relations which aim to reconcile the tensions of 
conflict and cooperation.  Yet workplace partnership, as particular form of collaborative 
employment relations and as a form of employee voice, still lacks a commonly accepted 
definition. Given this inherent ambiguity, and in order to make some progress, we must 
return to some fundamental assumptions about the nature of organisational life and the 
characteristics of the employment relationship.   It is useful to turn to the work of Alan Fox in 
this respect, as ‘frames of reference’ (Fox, 1966), can have important implications regarding 
the desirability and feasibility of workplace partnership.   
Unitarism emphasises the common goals of an enterprise, with employees regarded as 
team members united by loyalty to their employer around a common goal of business 
success. For Unitarists, conflict is counterproductive and unnecessary; normally the result of 
poor management communication, bad outside influences or aberrant employee behaviour.  
Cooperation is viewed as the natural state of employment relations. Thus there is no 
inherent governance challenge to manage or other ‘interest’ to develop a ‘partnership’ with. 
The regulation of employment is best left either to the external ‘invisible hand’ of the market 
or some version of ‘sophisticated human relations’ which aims to integrate employer and 
employee interests and maximise employee commitment and involvement (Purcell and 
Sisson, 1983).  Financial involvement and shared ownership is one possible option in this 
regard, as is direct employee participation in day-to-day job-related issues. Decision making 
power, however, is left in management hands meaning if this is a form of ‘partnership’, it is a 
one-side form of partnership (Guest and Peccei, 2001).  Similar arguments can made 
regarding debate on High Performance Work Systems or more recently Employee 
Engagement, which tend to focus upon the relationships employees have with organisations 
as individuals (see for example Harley, this volume and Saks and Gruman, this volume).   In 
short, while aspects of Unitarism might hold true for some employers who are ambivalent or 
even suspicious of employee collective representation and trade unions, most IR scholars 
reject this view of organisational life unrealistic (Johnstone and Ackers, 2013).   
Pluralism, on the other hand, views organisations as ‘miniature democratic states 
composed of sectional groups with divergent interests’ (Fox, 1966: 2).  Organisations are 
characterised by complex tensions which need to be managed in order to reconcile different 
opinions and keep conflict within accepted bounds. A key challenge is the regulation of 
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employment and the representation of competing interests. Different interests are believed to 
be both inevitable and legitimate; the focus is therefore upon developing channels through 
which conflict can be channelled, expressed and institutionalised.  Classical IR pluralists saw 
trade unions and collective bargaining as the single-channel solution to these problems (see 
Ackers, 2012 for a discussion). A pluralist perspective on partnership draws upon continental 
European industrial democracy and a perceived need to address the imbalance of power 
between capital and labour.  Legislative intervention is believed to be required to address 
such an imbalance, resulting in commitments to co-determination, consultation and 
communication, and robust employee representation is a central feature of this model of 
worker participation (Guest and Peccei, 2001). A limitation, perhaps, is that Pluralism has 
traditionally emphasised collective bargaining through trade unions as the best system of 
employment relations governance, albeit a conflict-oriented system often characterised by 
arms-length adversarialism and focus upon bargaining over distributive issues.  Such a 
system remains at odds with the shift to more collaborative relations emphasised by 
workplace partnership. 
Unitarist/Pluralist Hybrid.  In reality, in the context of the Anglo-Saxon economies 
partnership involves a blend of unitarist and pluralist assumptions.  Conceptually, many of 
the aspirations of partnership appear Unitarist in tone, for example commitments to the 
success of the organisation, and notions of harmony, cooperation, and win-win.  Partnership 
can in part be viewed as an evolution of 1980s Employee Involvement and ‘soft HRM’.  
Nevertheless, when partnership is operationalised as an employment relations process it is 
generally founded upon pluralist assumptions (Kinge, 2013), such as joint recognition of 
each parties interests, and commitments to managing the tension between the employers 
desire for workforce flexibility versus employees desire for job security. Inspiration is taken 
from countries with embedded systems of societal-level social partnership between labour 
and business interests, and where trade unions are influential.  Again in practice, it is also 
likely that a workplace partnership will form one component of an overarching HR system, 
co-existing with various direct Employee Involvement and HRM techniques. Indeed, one of 
the most influential articulations of such a hybrid approach comes from Kochan and 
Osterman (1994) and their conceptualisation of the ‘mutual gains enterprise’ in the context of 
the US. 
Central to the work of Kochan and Osterman is the need for integration of employment 
relations system within the overall workplace HR system.  Drawing on developments in 
1980s ‘Strategic Choice School’ partnership can be viewed a particular model of 
organisational governance which can constitute part of a mutually beneficial high 
performance work system. The idea is that such a system means overall performance and 
productivity can be increased, which in turns mean greater gains which can subsequently be 
distributed.   However, Kochan and Osterman (1994) deliberately avoid the term ‘High 
Performance Work System’ stating that: 
“[mutual gains] conveys a key message: achieving and sustaining competitive advantage 
from human resources requires the strong support of multiple stakeholders...employees 
must commit their energies to meeting the economic objectives of the enterprise.  In return, 
owners must share the economic returns with employees and invest those returns in such as 
way as promotes the long-run economic security of the workforce (Kochan and Osterman, 
1994, 46). 
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3.  THE CASE FOR AND AGAINST WORKPLACE PARTNERSHIP  
Given these different perspectives and conceptualisations of partnership, it is perhaps 
inevitable that the partnership debate of has resulted in a strongly contested case both ‘for’ 
and ‘against’ the potential for workplace partnership to deliver mutual gains for all 
organisational actors.  It is to this debate that we now turn.  
The case for partnership 
The case for partnership has two main strands.  Firstly, it is suggested that partnership is in 
the best interests of employers, employees, unions and governments.  Much has focused 
upon partnership as the only option for the revitalising the beleaguered trade union 
movement in many liberal market economies (Ackers and Payne, 1998).  Within a voluntarist 
environment where employers have significant latitude over their preferred approach to the 
conduct of employment relations generally, and employee voice specifically, it is argued that 
trade unions can use partnership as a way of achieving much-needed buy in from 
employers. Trade unions can thus be viewed, as both Tony Blair and Barack Obama have 
stated, as part of the solution to employment relations and business challenges (Spillius, 
2009). Partnership can be viewed as compatible with – and even supportive of – business 
success, and as such the only form of unionism likely to attract much-needed state support.  
Secondly, and in addition to political support, employer support is also believed to be 
essential, and working in partnership to support business success is believed to be the only 
option for winning this support.  Partnership is thus a potentially shrewd strategy in terms of 
revitalising the labour movement and repositioning trade unions as a legitimate and even 
desirable form of employee voice in contemporary workplaces.  Thirdly, it has been 
suggested that cooperative labour-management approaches are desired by most workers.  
Employees have become disaffected with adversarial industrial relations and unions can 
revitalise themselves (in the eyes of members) by adopting a more cooperative and 
collaborative approach to employment relations (Kochan, 2000).  In the UK, for example, it 
has been suggested that there is simply no appetite among most workers to return the 
adversarialism and divisiveness of the 1970s and 1980s (Brown, 2010).  Finally, it is argued 
that partnership approaches to workplace representation are  
The second argument in favour of partnership is that it will deliver mutual gains which can in 
turn be shared among the actors (see Avgar and Owens, this volume). The mutual gains 
thesis is based upon the proposition that collaboration affords the opportunity to expand the 
‘size of the pie’ available in a way which would not be achieved through a more adversarial 
model focus upon just ‘dividing the pie’ (Cooke, 1990; Freeman and Medoff, 1984); in other 
words a shift from zero-sum to positive-sum relations.  In some of the earlier US writings on 
the potential benefits of labour-management cooperation, it has been suggested that the 
benefits included enhanced union capacity to represent member interests and in turn greater 
employee commitment to and support of unions. It is Employees also benefit from higher 
levels of job satisfaction, greater voice, improved work life balance, less stress and greater 
autonomy, Finally, employers stand to benefit from improved firm performance, employee 
commitment, less conflict, productivity, staff retention; quality, and higher quality employment 
relations (Cooke, 1990; Kochan and Osterman, 1994). 
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The case against partnership 
The case against partnership is primarily underpinned by a view that the achievement of 
mutual gains is illusory at best and damaging at worst, with potentially detrimental 
consequences for trade unions, their members, and the regulation of work and employment 
in general (Gall, 2008; Kelly, 2004; Thompson, 2003; Upchurch et.al, 2008).  Mutual gains 
are believed to be illusory for several reasons.  Firstly, at the micro (firm) level, it is 
suggested that many firms compete on the basis of a ‘low road’ strategy based upon cost-
minimisation and low pay, despite the rhetoric of shifts towards a more sophisticated and 
potentially enlightened ‘high performance HRM’. Secondly, at a macro (political economy) 
level, structures of corporate governance and employer-dominance mean a short-term focus 
on financial performance is inevitably prioritised despite rhetoric of stakeholding.  The notion 
of, for example, balancing flexibility with security is therefore naive at best.  Neo-liberal 
capitalism and financialisation, it is argued, means that even good willed employers will be 
unable to keep promised to share either the gains or pains experienced, and as such mutual 
gains are unattainable (Thompson, 2003).  Management will always hold the upper hand 
and as a result any notion of balance is inevitably false, unscrupulous employers might seek 
to exploit the advantages position partnership affords. Even more critically is the suggestion 
that partnership could actually act as a facade for the further exploitation of ordinary labour 
by employers. In short, partnership cannot deliver for trade unions, and, as a result will mean 
they are unable to effectively represent their members.  Partnership will further undermine 
the legitimacy of trade unions in the eyes of their members.  Within lightly regulated 
employment regimes, the resultant imbalance of power, means strategies such as 
organising, or militancy are thus more appropriate strategy of revitalising trade unions. 
(Kelly, 2004).  Genuine partnership would require a degree of labour-parity, which liberal 
market economies such as the Anglo-Saxon nations do not and cannot offer. 
An ideological divide 
In trying to understand these contradictory perspectives, it is useful to return briefly to 
notions of frames of reference (Fox, 1966).  Most commentators broadly in support of the 
case for partnership subscribe to a Pluralist view of organisations.  Ackers (2002; 2012) has 
taken this a step further in his conceptualisation of a particular brand of pluralism which he 
terms ‘neo-pluralism’. He argues that while classical IR pluralism came to be associated with 
an over-reliance on trade unions and collective bargaining, a narrow emphasis on relations 
within the organisation, and a rather passive tolerance of damaging levels of conflict or 
‘arms-length adversarialism’, Neo-pluralism retains the core sense of a collective tension in 
the employment relationship, but stresses the potential to bridge this through pro-active 
partnership solutions. Workers and management can construct high levels of co-operation, 
sometimes termed, ‘productivity coalitions’. Shared values around specific projects can give 
a normative momentum to collaboration. Unions are usually central to this, but so are other 
forms of employee involvement and stakeholder relationship that go beyond ‘wages and 
conditions’ to wider issues of work-life quality and balance.  A neo-pluralist perspective sees 
a potential for conflict between employer and employees over both the processes of 
employment regulation and the distribution of economic outcomes (Ackers, 2012).  The 
challenge is to develop institutions of workplace governance and regulation which pre-empt 
and resolve conflict, while actively promoting cooperation.  In many ways this resonates with 
the shift from constitutional pluralism to consultative pluralism (Purcell and Sisson, 1983). 
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Most critical commentators of partnership, on the other hand, subscribe to a more Radical 
perspective of the employment relationship and argue almost the exact opposite. Influenced 
by Marxism, IR radicals stress the inevitability of workplace conflict, linked to societal class 
strife arising from inequalities of power inherent in the entire economic, social, political, and 
legal structure.  Capitalism creates fundamental inequalities and leaves little potential for 
constructive bargaining processes. Corporate governance within neo-liberal systems which 
prioritise shareholder returns combined with management opportunism make voluntarism a 
high risk strategy. Streeck (1998) suggests that within a “rational voluntarist” model it is easy 
for parties to withdraw and defect from approaches which might be in the best long-term 
interests of the partners, as opposed to responding to short-term expediencies (see also 
Thompson, 2003).  Attempts at partnership could actually mask and reinforce inequalities 
behind a veneer of cooperation, while seeking to re-balance the employment relationship 
through regulation is likely to be futile. Kelly (1996) suggests that the growing hostility of 
employers to any form of union and the meagre achievements of partnership underline this 
clash of interests, and therefore, in the absence of strong macro level supports, militant 
union opposition to management is considered to be a better approach.   
4.  INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCES OF PARTNERSHIP  
United Kingdom  
In the UK, the recent interest in workplace partnership can be traced to the early 1990s, and 
builds upon a long history of employee participation and interest in labour management 
cooperation. The turning point towards workplace partnership is typically attributed to the 
election of New Labour and the Blair government in 1997.  Politically, the Blair government 
followed almost 20 years of a Conservative government which had, following the industrial 
relations crises of 1970’s Britain, sought to limit the power of trade unions and 
deemphasised the collective dimension of employment relations.  Trade unions have long 
been significant benefactors to Labour party and made significant financial contributions to 
the 1997 election campaign.  However, ‘New’ Labour attempted to strike a difficult balance 
between being perceived to be ‘business friendly’ by trade union interests on the one hand 
and too ‘union friendly’ by business interests on the other.    However, the Trade Union 
Congress and Confederation of British Industry, had also been, to some extent, sidelined by 
the Conservative government.  While government interest in European-style national level 
social partnership was limited, there was some evidence of increased engagement between 
government and other stakeholders.  TUC leader John Monks ‘New Unionism’ was broadly 
supportive of the need for unions to work together with organisations in the public and 
private sector to improve their competitiveness, a stance also taken by his successor 
Brendan Barber (Brown, 2010).    The context was also one of union decline, which was 
arguably as much about the changing economic environment and the intensification of global 
competition than had to do with unsympathetic government policies of Thatcher (Brown, 
2010). Economically, the election came following a decade of growth and New Labour set 
out with the ‘Fairness at Work’ agenda which aimed at improve both economic performance 
as well as the ‘modernisation’ of employment relations (DTI, 1998). The rhetoric was of 
fostering a model of trade unionism which provided services to members but which also 
helped firms to become more competitive (Howell, 2005). Practical and financial support to 
promote partnership was made available through Government-funded Partnership at Work 
Programme. 
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At a workplace level, partnerships often arose out of a crisis situation.  Several partnership 
agreements were signed by a range of high profile employers - such as Tesco and Barclays 
Bank - and their recognised trade unions.  Reflecting higher union density in the public 
sector, a large proportion often agreements were also signed in the public sector.  However, 
formal workplace partnership has not become the dominant form of employment relations in 
Britain.  A useful analysis of the spread of partnership has been conducted by Bacon and 
Samuel (2009). Their findings reveal 248 formal partnership agreements signed in the period 
1990-2007; with the highest proportions signed in health and social work (34%); public 
administration (19%) and manufacturing (15%). In 2007, partnership agreements in the UK 
covered 1/3 of employees in the public sector but only 4% of workers in the private sector. 
Overall, this suggests that around 10% of all UK employees are employed in a workplace 
covered by a partnership agreement.   While this might sound small, this was rise from only 
1% ten years earlier.  Importantly, most appear to be robust with over 80% ‘surviving’; few 
employers have simply reneged upon a partnership agreement.  Where partnership 
agreements have ended, common causes are mergers and acquisitions, as well as changes 
of business ownership.  However, unlike some more pessimistic commentators, the authors 
reject the notion that partnership is “fading from the British industrial relations agenda” 
(Bacon and Samuel, 2009; p.261).  Survival of partnership in particular contexts might be 
interpreted both in optimistic terms that it is because the actors continue to perceive overall 
benefits, or in more pragmatic terms whereby perhaps  unions and employers feel that 
consider partnership to be better than alternatives. 
Ireland  
Ireland, in contrast to the UK, developed a centralised bargaining system as part of a 
national-level social partnership between 1987 and 2009.  This was concerned with the 
alignment of wage determination processes with state macro-economic priorities, the launch 
of various social and economic initiatives, and involved unions, employers, government and 
community/voluntary organisations (Rittau and Dundon, 2010).   However, like the UK, 
collective bargaining has traditionally been conducted within a broadly voluntarist framework.  
However, in the 1990s, there was increasing recognition of a disconnect between national 
level social partnership and the conduct of employment relations at the workplace level 
(Teague and Hann, 2010).  There was subsequent interest in the concept of partnership at 
the micro (workplace) level, especially after 1997 and promotion of workplace partnership 
become more explicit in the document ‘Partnership 2000’.  This provided a framework for 
partnership and encouraged a broad shift towards cooperative employment relations in 
private/public as well as unionised and non-unionised contexts.  A National Centre for 
Partnership, later renamed the National Centre for Partnership and Performance (NCPP), 
was also established in 2000 to support partnership (Roche and Teague, 2013), as was the 
Workplace Innovation Fund (Dobbins, 2010).  The Irish Congress of Trade Unions and the 
Irish Business and Employers Federation also developed partnership principles in a similar 
way to their UK equivalents.  However, the approach to partnership promotion has been soft 
with a reluctance to engage in regulation which, it is believed, might have compromised 
Ireland as an attractive place for foreign direct investment (Dobbins, 2010).  Nevertheless, 
several high profile organisations – such as Aer Rianta and Waterford Crystal – embraced 
the partnership approach at the workplace level (Teague and Hann, 2010), although the 
adoption of partnership has not been widespread. Rittau and Dundon (2010) suggested that 
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the diffusion of partnership has been low with around 25% organisations reporting some 
form of workplace partnership agreement (Rittau and Dundon, 2010). 
Australia and New Zealand  
In Australia and New Zealand, interest in partnership can be traced to government initiatives 
to improve workplace employment relations and performance in the 1990s and 2000s 
respectively.  Similar to the UK and Ireland experiences, the aim was to use ‘soft’ regulation 
to encourage management and unions to shift towards a ‘high road’ approach to the conduct 
of employment relations (MacNeil et.al, 2013).  However, both Australia and New Zealand, 
have traditionally differed from other Anglo-Saxon liberal market economies such as the UK 
and USA.   Until the 1980s both countries have been described as having “moderately 
coordinated economies”, given the level of regulation and intervention of business and 
employment policy.  However, since the 1980s the trend in both nations has been towards 
greater economic deregulation, decentralisation, and individualisation of the employment 
relationship, bringing the two nations increasingly into line with other liberal market Anglo-
Saxon economies (MacNeil et.al, 2013, p3815).  Similarly, both nations have had instances 
of social democratic governments utilising ‘soft’ rather than ‘hard’ regulation to promote a 
more ‘partnership’ approach to employment relations, reflecting in part a trajectory towards 
increasing economic liberalisation,  as well as possible actor preferences for voluntary 
participation in labour-management partnership initiatives.  Examples of specific initiatives 
include the Partnership Resource Centre in New Zealand and the Workplace Productivity 
and Partnership Pilot in Queensland, Australia. 
In Australia, labour management cooperation was promoted as part of ‘Best Practice’ 
through the Australian Best Practice Demonstration Program established by the Labour 
government in the early 1990s, at a time when, like many other countries the nation was 
entering economic recession.  This was bolstered by various other government programmes 
to support training, export, innovation and workplace restructuring and cooperation.  From 
this perspective, partnership could be viewed as a component of other ‘best practice’ and 
organisational change initiatives which were influential at the time.  However, when the 
Howard government took office in 1996, the approach to employment relations changed, and 
the administration took a less sympathetic stance to trade unions.  The government 
terminated the best practice programme and interest in ‘Best Practice’ quickly evaporated.  
The notion of partnership has since reappeared under the Gillard government (MacNeil et.al, 
2011).  
In New Zealand, when the Labour Party came to power after 15 years of Conservative 
government, it was also interested in devising means of managing which balanced economic 
performance, on the one hand, and workplace reform on the other.  In part the impetus came 
from concerns about low productivity in New Zealand compared to other small nations such 
as Finland, Denmark and Singapore.  Partnership was supported by the PRC which was 
created in 2005 and offered support in moving towards a partnership approach.  However, 
the impact was mainly in the public sector given the relatively low levels of union recognition 
in the New Zealand private sector (MacNeil et.al, 2011).   However, it has been argued that 
outside the New Zealand Public Service Association formal partnership relations between 
management and unions at workplace level remain “virtually unknown” (Haynes et.al, 2006, 
225). 
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5. OUTCOMES OF PARTNERSHIP  
International of workplace partnership have attracted a high level of interest from academic 
researchers, providing a strong body of evidence regarding the outcomes of partnership in 
achieving their espoused goals.  A rich body of empirical evidence now exists in relation to 
the experience of partnership in the UK and Ireland.  Three main perspectives dominate the 
literature: the ‘pessimistic perspective’, the ‘constrained mutuality’ perspective and the 
‘contingency perspective’.  We now explore each of these perspectives. 
The pessimistic perspective suggests that workers and trade unions do not stand to gain 
much, if anything, from workplace partnership.  Evidence of this perspective is probably most 
apparent in the partnership critiques in the British literature.  John Kelly (1996; 2004) is 
probably the most vocal proponent of this perspective.  In a study of matched partnership 
and non-partnership firms, Kelly (2004) found that while employers appeared to benefit from 
partnership, there were negligible gains for workers or trade unions when evaluated against 
criteria such as wages, hours worked, holidays, or job losses.  Employee gains were only 
found to be achieved where unions were strong, and where the firm was performing well. His 
findings in terms of factors such as wage levels, influence in the company, and employment 
security were negative.  Gall (2008) also represents this critical perspective, and suggests 
that in some cases partnership has actually weakened unions and worker influence over 
issues such as the terms and conditions of employment, with limited endorsement of 
partnership from union members.  Critical studies thus reject the mutual gains thesis, and 
suggest a range of negative outcomes for labour are actually more likely including difficulties 
demonstrating union effectiveness, greater distance between unions and their members, 
work intensification, job insecurity, and labour outcomes no better than non-partnership firms 
(Kelly, 2004; Upchurch et.al, 2008).  
On other hand, several British studies have revealed some benefits including stronger union 
organisation at the workplace level, greater employee support for unions, improved 
consultation, and enhanced union access to senior decision makers (Wills 2004; Samuel, 
2007).  This is not to say, however, that this more optimistic perspective portrays some kind 
of mutual gains nirvana; mutuality is often ‘constrained’ (Guest and Peccei, 2001).  The 
‘constrained mutuality’ perspective suggests that employees may well stand to benefit from 
partnership, but typically the ‘balance of advantage’ will be tipped in favour of the employer, 
focused upon, for example, employee responsibilities and productivity rather than employee 
welfare (Guest and Peccei, 2001).  Nevertheless, to be sustainable, partnership cannot be 
completed lop-sided, for “positive organisational outcomes of interest to employers depend 
for their achievement upon the prior achievement of outcomes likely to be relevant to 
employees and their representatives (Guest and Peccei, 2001; 1321).   In other words, when 
partnership is perceived to be serving primarily or even exclusively the interests of 
employers, the potential for these gains will be short-lived.  Similarly, positive outcomes of 
workplace partnership have also been identified in the Irish context (Roche and Geary, 2002; 
2006; Geary and Trif, 2010; Rittau and Dundon, 2010; Roche, 2009; Dobbins, 2010).    For 
employers the gains identified have included improved productivity, support for change, 
greater flexibility, higher levels of trust, better communications, fewer disputes, better 
employment relations climate, employee commitment, reduced absenteeism and labour 
turnover and higher levels of innovation. For employees positive outcomes identified include 
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greater job satisfaction and sense of fairness, better communications, information provision, 
pay and working hours and influence over the job. Finally, for trade unions perceived 
benefits of workplace partnership in Ireland include greater influence and involvement, 
higher membership as well as the ability to better represent members. 
In some ways these two perspectives can be combined by the notion that partnership 
outcomes are contingent upon a range of conditions which determine the favourability of the 
context to partnership working.  Firstly, at a macro-level, the national legislative environment 
is believed to be significant.  In the context of the UK, Samuel and Bacon (2010) suggest 
that perhaps it is expecting too much for employers and unions to recast employment 
relations towards an ‘enlightened’ approach without the coercion found in other northern 
continental European countries.  They highlight the limitations of a non-statutory approach to 
diffusing partnership employment relations, with arms-length and low trust approaches to 
employment relations still common in many British workplaces (Samuel and Bacon, 2010).   
Similarly, in Ireland, it has been argued that workplace cooperation goes against the grain of 
voluntarist regimes which prioritise shareholder value and short-term results, and despite a 
macro level social partnership, the use of law in promoting workplace partnership has been 
avoided with national social partnership largely disconnected from workplace employment 
relations strategies (Dobbins, 2010).  
However, where partnerships have been forged, they have often been driven by workplace 
level factors, such as business crisis, organisational change, or addressing poor 
employment relations.   It could be argued that organisations which have voluntarily and 
proactively entered into partnerships might provide fertile ground for the development of 
cooperative employment relations precisely because the decision has been made voluntarily 
rather than an arranged marriage imposed by legislation.  It could also be argued if we 
simply accept that ‘employers cannot keep their promises’ (Thompson, 2003), we risk 
becoming locked into a position of economic determinism.  Evans et.al, (2012) suggest that 
besides (macro) political economy factors, we should also consider features of the industry 
(meso) or micro (micro) context that might support mutual gains.  Increasingly the research 
evidence lends support to a more nuanced and contingent perspective, suggesting several 
factors which are believed to be supportive of partnership, including for example, a buoyant 
economic climate; a quality-driven business strategy, management support; union support, 
strong actor relationships, trust, high union density and integration with supportive HR 
practices (see for example, Belanger and Edwards, 2007; Dobbins, 2010; Geary and Trif, 
2011).   The fact that many flagship British partnership agreements still appear to be robust 
(Bacon and Samuel, 2009) further calls into question some of the more deterministic 
arguments (Thompson, 2003).   
 
6. CONCLUSION  
To conclude, a strong ideological dimension to partnership remains when considering the a 
priori conceptual case for and against workplace partnership (McBride and Stirling, 2002).  
Partnership appears to be more acceptable to IR Pluralists, while Radicals remain sceptical 
due to beliefs that political economy and corporate governance undermine any serious 
attempt at ‘partnership’ (Kelly, 2004; Thompson, 2003).   Pluralists, on the other hand, argue 
that mutual gains can be achieved within a context of ‘permissive voluntarism’ (Dobbins, 
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2010),  but that both the effectiveness of the process and the balance of gains depend upon 
the favourability contextual factors such as the rationale for partnership, product and labour 
markets, technology, and competitive strategy.  It could be argued that many of these factors 
determine the extent to which governments and employers are convinced that a ‘business 
case’ for partnership is believed to exist, perhaps as a voice regime supportive of an 
organisation pursuing a High Performance Work System approach to labour management 
and HRM, where management believe labour management cooperation is essential for 
productivity and competitiveness (Butler et.al, 2011).  
These conceptual and theoretical debates also influence how we interpret the empirical 
evidence on partnership, and in particular the extent to which such analyses focus upon 
interpreting the evidence as ‘partial success’ or ‘partial failure’.  What constitutes success is 
highly problematic (Geary and Trif, 2011), in part because radicals focus upon ‘hard’ 
substantive outcomes, while pluralists also value ‘soft’ outcomes such as the quality of 
relationships and fairness of organisational processes and procedures (Evans et.al, 2012; 
see also the distinction by Cooke, 1990 on extrinsic versus intrinsic costs and benefits).  To 
add to this complexity, different organisational actors may place different weights upon the 
perceived balance of these outcomes (Geary and Trif, 2011). Of  course, partnership must 
do more than simply improving the quality of relationships and must also generate tangible 
hard outcomes (Kochan et.al, 2008) but the former may even be a precondition for the 
achievement of the latter (Evans et.al , 2012). 
 We need to transcend simplistic ‘who wins/ who loses’ debates, and continue to develop a 
richer understanding of the context, processes, meaning and outcomes of partnership, as 
well as the contextual conditions associated with both positive and negative evaluations of 
workplace partnership (Johnstone et.al, 2009).  Some thirty years after Purcell and Sisson 
(1983) outlined a ‘Sophisticated Modern (Consultative)’ variant in their typology of 
management styles, it could be argued that we have limited evidence of such a model 
becoming a dominant model of employment relations in most Anglo-Saxon nations. 
Partnership appears to remain a relatively rare model of employment relations, and it is easy 
to dismiss such approaches on the grounds that they have failed to ‘modernise’ employment 
relations (Wilkinson et.al, 2013).   However the pressures to identify and develop forms of 
governance and voice which can manage the strategic tensions between economic and 
social imperatives which characterise the management of work and employment. The quest 
for workplace cooperation, mutual gains and collaboration is unlikely to go away (Boxall, 
1996; 2013), whatever the process is called (Brown, 2010). 
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